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Back when my friend Sandy Levinson and I were both on the Texas law faculty, the
assistant dean for communications proposed a promotional tour featuring Professor
Levinson’s book Our Undemocratic Constitution and my recently published piece in this
journal, The Constitution Outside the Constitution. The plan was that Levinson would say
the Constitution is bad, and I would add that it isn’t really even the Constitution. In the
event, we did not get to take our show on the road, so I’m grateful for the present
opportunity to address the intersection of our respective projects. To the extent that
criticism emerges from his many kind comments, Levinson’s main complaints have to do
with “complacency” about both the law school curriculum and the merits of the canonical
Constitution. The point is a fair one. As will become evident, I am even more
“complacent” than Levinson gives me credit for. The question is whether such
complacency can be defended.
Take the curriculum first. Professor Levinson seems to want to put our jobs in jeopardy
by doubting that “there is a justification” for “requir[ing] . . . students to take
constitutional law.” But I dispute his assertion that “few students will practice
‘constitutional law.’” I have argued that much of the law that “constitutes” our
government—that creates governmental institutions, defines their jurisdiction and
processes, and confers individual rights against government action—is “ordinary” law in
the form of statutes, regulations, conventions, and practices. All of our students will
interact with this law in the course of their lives as lawyers. Most students will not be
involved in a Commerce Clause challenge to a federal statute like United States v. Lopez,
but most will have to trace the statutory boundaries of federal power in litigating or
advising on issues of preemption or agency authority. Many may never pursue
discrimination claims under the Equal Protection Clause, but they may well pursue
statutory equality claims under Title VII or the Americans with Disabilities Act. And
students working as legislative staffers or lobbyists may rarely bump up against Article
I’s lawmaking requirements, but they must surely navigate the committee structures,
deliberative procedures, and voting rules that make up our extra-canonical lawmaking
constitution. Levinson would no doubt say that I have simply avoided his point by
changing the definition of “Constitutional Law.” But one reason to make that change is to
recover the relevance of our subject.
PRINT ARCHIVE FORUM SUBMISSIONS MASTHEAD ABOUT CONTACT
The Yale Law Journal - Forum: Curricula and Complacency: A Response to Professor Levinson
http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/curricula-and-complacency-a-response-to-professor-levinson[11/4/2015 3:53:54 PM]
It makes a difference to think of these more prosaic and pervasive endeavors as part of
“Constitutional Law.” The problem is not simply that one cannot really understand the
canonical structures—for example, Article I’s bicameralism and presentment requirements
—without knowing something about the extra-canonical structures that have grown up
around them. More importantly, these extra-canonical structures and rights should be
understood as implementing entrenched constitutional values such as federalism,
separation of powers, and individual liberty. Federalism values are relevant, for instance,
when construing the extent to which a statute preempts state law—even absent dispute
that a broad reading of the statute would fit within the Commerce Power. Students’
understanding of “ordinary” laws will be enhanced if they see those laws as playing a role
within a constitutional structure.
Does this mean that I think that students “have a woefully inadequate understanding of
the operative Constitution as it functionally exists in 2008”? Not really. Many constitutive
statutes, regulations, and practices are covered in other courses, and there is an increasing
tendency to cover particular areas—such as election law and foreign relations law—in
ways that integrate the canonical Constitution side-by-side with extra-canonical features.
Integrated consideration of the legislative and regulatory institutions of the administrative
state, exemplified by new first-year courses at Vanderbilt and Harvard, is likely to be
salutary. On the current state of the constitutional law curriculum, then, I am even more
complacent than Levinson suggests.
Professor Levinson’s more fundamental objection is that I am too complacent about the
canonical Constitution itself, which he sees as badly needing an overhaul. At least some
of his criticisms are surely well taken. My recent attempt to explain the Electoral College
to my 10-year-old son Michael, for instance, reduced the poor kid to tears because, at
some level, the institution simply cannot be made to make sense. But I confess that I
don’t lie awake at night worrying about the Electoral College. For starters, I take
seriously Edmund Burke’s warning that institutional “reform” may have unintended
consequences, and I thus need a great deal of evidence before endorsing basic changes. I
am far more inclined to worry about the erosion of the canonical Constitution—for
example, through the steady migration of power from the states to the national
government or from the Congress to the President.
One reason for complacency is that I see the canonical Constitution as less of an “iron
cage” than Professor Levinson does, even with respect to some of the features that he
identifies as unchangeable without a formal amendment. Like my friends Lynn Baker and
Sam Dinkin, Levinson worries about the malapportionment of the Senate. I am less
convinced than they that numerical population is the only value worthy of representation,
but, even if it is, the effects of malapportionment can be mitigated through any number of
changes to ordinary law. For example, the filibuster currently exacerbates
malapportionment by making it even easier for a coalition of small states to block
legislation, but the filibuster can be eliminated simply by changing the Senate’s rules. The
most easily demonstrated impact of malapportionment is the disproportionate diversion of
federal funds to smaller states, but that might be mitigated through earmark reform.
The same thing is true of many complaints about presidential elections. Individual states
can lessen the impact of the Electoral College by choosing to divide their electors in
proportion to the popular vote within the state. Or, the disconnect between the electoral
and popular votes could be eliminated entirely through the proposed National Popular
Vote Interstate Compact. Professor Levinson also does not like the “10-week hiatus
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between . . . the repudiation of a sitting president . . . and the inauguration of his or her
successor.” But only the inauguration date is set in constitutional stone; the election date
is set by federal statute. Want a shorter hiatus? Move back the election—by ordinary
legislation.
I do not mean to take a firm position on whether something like the Popular Vote
Compact is constitutional, much less on whether it would be a good idea. The point is
simply that Professor Levinson’s “iron cage” may well be more permeable than he thinks.
Recognizing the critical role of the “Constitution Outside the Constitution” may help us
identify solutions that are far easier to implement than his cri de coeur for a
Constitutional Convention. Moreover as my friend (and evidently fellow Burkean)
Heather Gerken has suggested, there are advantages to the incremental process of
“informal”—or extra-canonical—amendment. For one thing, we may not be sufficiently
confident in our fixes for the problems Levinson identifies to risk replacing our current
cage with a new one, also made out of iron. And if the proposal is not simply for
amendments to cure particular ills but also an easier method of amendment, that may in
turn undermine those constitutional fixtures—such as certain individual rights—that we
do want to have kryptonite-like properties.
Far better to make sure we have exhausted the potential of extra-canonical change before
risking the perils of more fundamental restructuring. The counsel of complacency is also
the counsel of caution.
Ernest A. Young is Professor of Law at Duke Law School. He is grateful to Sanford
Levinson for his comments and for much else, too.
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